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BOOK REVIEWS 
Universes, by John Leslie. London and New York: Routledge, 1989. Pp. vii, 
228. Cloth. 
PETER VAN INWAGEN, Syracuse University. 
The cosmos appears to have been designed as an abode for life. This has been 
amply demonstrated by the marriage of cosmology and elementary-particle 
physics that is one of the most striking features of the current scientific scene. 
The universe evolved out of an initial singularity (or a "quantum fuzz" or a 
region of "imaginary time") some fifteen thousand million years ago in ac-
cord with certain laws of nature. These laws contain apparently arbitrary 
numbers that are not determined by physical theory as it is currently under-
stood, but rather "have to be filled in by hand." One sort of example among 
many others would be the relati ve strengths of the various fundamental physi-
cal forces. (For example, electromagnetism is roughly 1039 times stronger 
than gravity. This ratio seems to be a brute fact. As far as theory goes, the 
exponent might have been 35 or 47 or any other number.) In addition to the 
apparently arbitrary numbers that are contained in the laws of nature that 
govern the cosmos, the cosmos itself displays quantifiable and seemingly 
contingent features, such as its total relativistic mass, its very low initial 
entropy, and the number of "families" of elementary particles it contains. 
Many of these numbers have the following interesting feature: if they had 
been only very slightly different, there would have been no life. (Among the 
many untoward effects that a slight variation in the numbers could have 
produced are the following: a cosmos that lasted only a few seconds; a cosmos 
that contained no atoms; a cosmos that contained no stars; a cosmos in which 
all matter was violently radioactive.) It is very probable that future develop-
ments in theoretical physics will shorten the list of independent numerical 
parameters in the laws of nature, and will thereby reduce the number of 
features of the laws of nature that could apparently have been otherwise. And 
it is possible that some of the features of the cosmos that are at present seen as 
"boundary conditions" ("input" for the laws of nature), such as the number of 
particle-families, will turn out to be consequences of the laws. Nevertheless, the 
degree of apparent contingency exhibited by the cosmos and its laws is impres-
sive. Even if future developments in physics greatly reduce this apparent con-
tingency, it looks as if there will be plenty left. It looks as if, whatever the future 
of physics and cosmology may hold, only a tiny region within the "space" 
defined by all possible variations in the numerical parameters that figure in the 
laws and cosmic boundary conditions contains life-permitting cosmoi. 
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Why does the cosmos look as if it had been designed as an abode for life? 
The most obvious explanation is that the universe looks as if it had been 
designed because it really was designed. But Darwin has shown how apparent 
design can be only apparent. (This conceptual point is independent of the 
question whether the theory of evolution by natural selection can account for 
the actual course of terrestrial evolution.) The theory of natural selection 
cannot be applied directly to the problem of the apparent design of the cos-
mos, since universes do not reproduce themselves with random hereditable 
variations. (Or do they? Since I wrote the preceding sentence, one of my 
colleagues at Syracuse University, the physicist Lee Smolin, has speculated 
that universes may do just that.) But some of the features of Darwinian 
explanations of apparent design in nature are so abstract and powerful that 
they can be lifted out of the context of biology and applied to the physical 
world as a whole. 
A purposive, rational being can survey a set of possibilities and, after due 
deliberation, cause one or more of them to become actual. Chance, on the 
other hand, may generate a large number of diverse actualities, and some 
"selection factor" may then weed out all but a few of these actualities. Under 
certain circumstances, the "surviving" actualities may be very much like the 
actualities that a purposive, rational being would have chosen to actualize 
after surveying a set of possibilities. Thus may chance and a selection factor 
conspire to mimic purposive design. In the theory of natural selection, actu-
alities are weeded out by being destroyed or, at any rate, prevented from 
reproducing. If, however, we are interested in explaining how apparent design 
may be only apparent, we are not forced to postulate a selection factor that 
weeds the garden of chance-generated actualities by allowing the continued 
existence only of actualities that exhibit apparent design; all that we really 
need is a selection factor that allows us to observe only chance-generated 
actualities that exhibit apparent design. All that we need is an "observational 
selection effect." 
Suppose that an enormous number of actual cosmoi of wildly varying 
properties were generated by chance, so many and so various that it was 
statistically unsurprising that a few of them had the delicately balanced set 
of features that permit a cosmos to contain life. Our cosmos, of course, would 
be one of the rare life-permitting ones. And suppose that we are unable to 
observe any of the others, the silent majority. (There could be many reasons 
for our inability to observe them. Perhaps the spacetime curvature of our 
cosmos "hides" them, or perhaps the others are simply too far away, or 
perhaps cosmoi exist "one at a time," like beads on a temporal string.) If all 
this were the case, it would look to us as if our cosmos were the only cosmos 
and as if it had been carefully "tuned" to permit the existence of life. But this 
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would be an illusion, generated by the interplay of chance (which blindly 
produces the enormous variety of actual cosmoi) and an observational selec-
tion effect (which allows us to see only our own cosmos, a cosmos that must, 
of course, be suitable for life). 
In this superb book, John Leslie argues that the fine-tuning of the cosmos 
presents us with a choice between the two "hypotheses" we have stated above: 
the "Design Hypothesis" and the "World Ensemble Hypothesis." He does not, 
however, understand the Design Hypothesis in quite the way that one might 
imagine, since he takes seriously the idea that the mere "ethical requiredness" 
of the existence of life might, unmediated by the actions of any conscious, 
purposive being, be responsible for the existence of a unique fine-tuned 
cosmos; and he is willing to count that possibility as a case of "design." In 
addition to the thesis that (1) the fine-tuning of the cosmos presents us with 
a choice between the Design Hypothesis (so understood) and the World En-
semble Hypothesis, the central theses of the book are the following: (2) 
Science cannot provide us with any decisive reason for accepting one of the 
hypotheses and rejecting the other; (3) Each of the two hypotheses has an 
equal initial right to be taken seriously; (4) The attempts of various philoso-
phers to show that there is nothing puzzling about the fine-tuning of the 
cosmos and its laws (nothing that requires any sort of explanation) are ludi-
crously bad; (5) Neither hypothesis can be seen on philosophical grounds to 
enjoy a decisive advantage over the other. 
The book has many virtues. To begin with, it is vigorously and clearly 
written and beautifully organized. Among its more substantive virtues is its 
very solid instruction in the relevant physics and cosmology. (The scientific 
accuracy of the book has been vouched for by an impressive array of experts.) 
It should be stressed, however, that anyone who is willing to take it as given 
that current physics and cosmology represent the cosmos and its laws as 
fine-tuned to support life can skip the solid-perhaps for some tastes too, too 
solid-instruction and have no difficulty in following the philosophical ar-
guments that are based on this assumption. These philosophical arguments 
strike me as being of a very high order. I can especially recommend Leslie's 
critique of those philosophers who have argued that any given combination 
of values of physical parameters is as probable as any other, and that therefore 
there could not be anything about the actual set of parameters displayed by 
the laws of nature that required an explanation. (Compare: There could be 
nothing that required an explanation in someone's being dealt four consecutive 
royal flushes, one in each suit, since the probability of such a sequence of hands 
is equal to the probability of being dealt any four particular hands successively.) 
In evaluating these arguments, Leslie makes very effective use of the principle 
that if a certain state of affairs strongly suggests a certain "tidy" explanation (as 
someone's being dealt four royal flushes in a row does, and someone's being 
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dealt four mediocre poker hands in a row does not), then it is not reasonable 
to contend that that state of affairs requires no explanation. 
Leslie also makes the very important point (which I am pretty sure has not 
been made by anyone else) that to argue that the cosmos exhibits apparent 
design, we need not employ the premise that only a minuscule subset of the 
whole set of possible cosmoi are life-permitting. It suffices to argue that only 
a minuscule subset of the possible cosmoi "in the local area" are life-permit-
ting. This is an important point because it might for all we know be that there 
are laws of nature and cosmos-designs radically and unimaginably different 
from "our" laws and the design of our cosmos. Indeed, it might be that 
practically all possible cosmoi are radically different from ours, and it might 
be that practically all of the radically different cosmoi are life-permitting. 
How can we know that this is not so? If we cannot, we are not in a position 
to employ the premise that only a minuscule subset of the set of all possible 
cosmoi are life-permitting. But if only a minuscule subset of the possible 
cosmoi that are "in the local area"-that differ from our cosmos only in being 
governed by laws of nature with the same general structure as our laws but 
with different numerical parameters "plugged into" them, and in having dif-
ferent boundary conditions for the laws to operate on-are life-permitting, 
this is a fact that demands an explanation, whether or not there are radically 
different possible cosmo. Here is an analogy. Suppose that there is a target 
that has an arrow sticking into it. Does this fact require an explanation? Well, 
not if the world is either chock full of targets or chock full of people shooting 
arrows at random. But if the world is large, and if there is only one target 
and only one arrow, then an explanation is required for the fact that the sole 
arrow is sticking into the sole target. Suppose now that the world is chock 
full of targets, with the exception of one area a mile across that contains but 
a single target, right at its center. And suppose that there is an arrow protrud-
ing from that target and no arrows to be found anywhere else in the mile-wide 
area. In this case, too, an explanation is required. And if we inhabit an area 
a mile across, containing, right at its center, a single target sporting the only 
arrow to be found in our little area (the rest of the world being hidden from 
us), we need not, in attempting to answer the question whether this state of 
affairs requires an explanation, consider the fact that, for all we know, the 
world outside our parochial one-target area is chock full of targets. We reason 
soundly when, without considering speculations about what lies outside the 
area we can observe, we conclude that there must be some explanation for 
the fact that there is an arrow in this target. 
The only reservations I have about Leslie's book concern his neo-plato-
nism, his (to me) very odd idea that the ethical requiredness of a state of 
affairs can bring about the realization of that state of affairs without the 
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mediation of the action of conscious, purposive beings. In this book, and in 
many previous publications (see especially his Value and Existence, Black-
well, 1979) Leslie has tried to make this idea intelligible, but he has not got 
through to me. For my part, despite his best efforts, the thesis that ethical 
re.quiredness can, it itself, be effective, remains as puzzling as the thesis that 
the beauty and sublimity of gothic architecture (considered simply as a pos-
sible system of architectural design) could bring about the existence of ca-
thedrals and colleges and guild-halls, without the mediation of the action of 
conscious, purposive beings. Ethical requiredness, to my mind, is an objective 
feature of certain states of affairs (although, as a Christian, I accept the 
teaching of my religion that ethical requiredness is not a feature of the state 
of affairs There being created rational beings and, a fortiori, not a feature of 
the state of affairs There being conscious organic life); it is nonetheless an 
abstraction, and abstractions are, so to speak, purely passive. It is sometimes 
tempting to talk otherwise. Godel, for example, has said that the axioms of 
set-theory "force themselves upon the mind as true." But if this statement is 
to have any chance of saying something ontologically coherent, it must mean 
that the mind, in contemplating the axioms of set-theory, thereby actualizes 
a powerful and unopposed disposition, which is a part of its own concrete 
character, to assent to them. All of the causality involved in this operation 
belongs to the disposition, which is a disposition of the concrete individual 
mind, or of the concrete individual being whose mind it is. It may be that the 
axioms of set-theory objectively possess a feature called, say, "intuitive ob-
viousness." If so, this feature of the axioms cannot affect even the flow of 
electrons inside a mathematician's skull. It may be that Christian theology is 
wrong and the state of affairs There being conscious organic life objectively 
possesses the feature "being ethically required." If so, this feature of that 
state of affairs is incapable of affecting even the course of thoughts in the 
mind of an ethically sensitive Demiurge, much less of bypassing the Demi-
urge and bringing about the existence of life on its own. (Leslie, by the 
way, is the neo-platonic analogue of a deist: he does not think that the 
ethical requiredness of certain states of affairs ever has any "local" effects, 
not even such local effects as an awareness of the ethical requiredness of 
these states of affairs in the minds of rational beings. His theory limits the 
effects of ethical requiredness to imposing laws and boundary conditions 
on the cosmos as a whole: ethical requiredness does just what the God of 
the deists does.) I don't mean to suggest that Leslie is unaware of these 
points or fails to discuss them at length. (See Chapter 8 of the book under review, 
as well as Value and Existence.) I am saying only that I remain unconvinced. 
However this may be, Universes is an important book and should be a part 
of the working library of anyone seriously interested in the Argument from 
Design. 
